length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-SRTI admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if d = 3. We also consider the "most stable" version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound for the d = 3 case. However for d = 2 we show that the latter problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Introduction
In the Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete lists (SRI), a graph G = (A, E) and a set of preference lists O are given, where the vertices A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } correspond to agents, and O = {≺ 1 , . . . , ≺ n }, where ≺ i is a linear order on the vertices adjacent to a i in G (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We refer to ≺ i as a i 's preference list. The agents that are adjacent to a i in G are said to be acceptable to a i . If a j and a k are two acceptable agents for a i where a j ≺ i a k then we say that a i prefers a j to a k .
Let M be a matching in G. If a i a j ∈ M then we let M(a i ) denote a j . An edge a i a j / ∈ M blocks M, or forms a blocking edge of M, if a i is unmatched or prefers a j to M(a i ), and similarly a j is unmatched or prefers a i to M(a j ). A matching is called stable if no edge blocks it. Denote by SR the special case of SRI in which G = K n . Gale and Shapley [9] observed that an instance of SR need not admit a stable matching. Irving [15] gave a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching or report that none exists, given an instance of SR. The straightforward modification of this algorithm to the SRI case is described in [12] . We call an SRI instance solvable if it admits a stable matching.
In practice agents may find it difficult to rank a large number of alternatives in strict order of preference. One natural assumption, therefore, is that preference lists are short, which corresponds to the graph being of bounded degree. Given an integer d ≥ 1, we define d-SRI to be the restriction of SRI in which G is of bounded degree d. This special case of SRI problem has potential applications in organising tournaments. As already pointed out in a paper of Kujansuu et al. [18] , SRI can model a pairing process similar to the Swiss system, which is used in large-scale chess competitions. The assumption on short lists is reasonable, because according to the Swiss system, players can be matched only to other players with approximately the same score.
A second variant of SRI, which can be motivated in a similar fashion, arises if we allow ties in the preference lists, i.e., ≺ i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is now a strict weak ordering. That is, ≺ i is a strict partial order in which incomparability is transitive. We refer to this problem as the Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SRTI) [17] . As in the SRI case, define d-SRTI to be the restriction of SRTI in which G is of bounded degree d. Denote by SRT the special case of SRTI in which G = K n . In the context of the motivating application of chess tournament construction as mentioned in the previous paragraph, d-SRTI is naturally obtained if a chess player has several potential partners of the same score and match history in the tournament.
In the SRTI context, ties correspond to indifference in the preference lists. In particular, if a i a j ∈ E and a i a k ∈ E where a j ≺ i a k and a k ≺ i a j then a i is said to be indifferent between a j and a k . Thus preference in the SRI context corresponds to strict preference in the case of SRTI. Relative to the strict weak orders in O, we can define stability in SRTI instances in exactly the same way as for SRI. This means, for example, that if a i a j ∈ M for some matching M, and a i is indifferent between a j and some agent a k , then a i a k cannot block M. The term solvable can be defined in the SRTI context in an analogous fashion to SRI. Using a highly technical reduction from a restriction of 3-SAT, Ronn [23] proved that the problem of deciding whether a given SRT instance is solvable is NP-complete. A simpler reduction was given by Irving and Manlove [17] .
For solvable instances of SRI there can be many stable matchings. Often it is beneficial to work with a stable matching that is fair to all agents in a precise sense [11, 16] . One such fairness concept can be defined as follows. Given two agents a i , a j in an instance I of SRI, where a i a j ∈ E, let rank(a i , a j ) denote the rank of a j in a i 's preference list (that is, 1 plus the number of agents that a i prefers to a j ). Let A M denote the set of agents who are matched in a given stable matching M. (Note that this set depends only on I and is independent of M by [12 Finding an egalitarian stable matching in SR was shown to be NP-hard by Feder [7] . Feder [7, 8] also gave a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem in the SRI setting. He also showed that an egalitarian stable matching in SR can be approximated within a factor of α of the optimum if and only if Minimum Vertex Cover can be approximated within the same factor α. It was proved later that, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, Minimum Vertex Cover cannot be approximated within 2 − ε for any ε > 0 [19] .
Given an unsolvable instance I of SRI or SRTI, a natural approximation to a stable matching is a most-stable matching [1] . Relative to a matching M in I, define bp(M) to be the set of blocking edges of M and let bp(I) denote the minimum value of |bp(M )|, taken over all matchings M in I. Then M is a most-stable matching in I if |bp(M)| = bp(I). The problem of finding a most-stable matching was shown to be NP-hard and not approximable within n k−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P = NP, where k = 1 2 if I is an instance of SR and k = 1 if I is an instance of SRT [1] . To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any previous work published on either the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in a solvable instance of SRI with bounded-length preference lists or the solvability of SRTI with boundedlength preference lists. This paper provides contributions in both of these directions, focusing on instances of d-SRI and d-SRTI for d ≥ 2, with the aim of drawing the line between polynomial-time solvability and NP-hardness for the associated problems in terms of d.
Our Contribution
In Section 2 we study the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in an instance of d-SRI. We show that this problem is NP-hard if d = 3, whilst there is a straightforward algorithm for the case that d = 2. We then consider the approximability of this problem for the case that d ≥ 3. We give an approximation algorithm with a performance guarantee of 9 7 for the case that d = 3, 11 7 if d = 4 and 13 7 if d = 5. These performance guarantees improve on Feder's 2-approximation algorithm for the general SRI case [7, 8] . In Section 3 we turn to d-SRTI and prove that the problem of deciding whether an instance of 3-SRTI is solvable is NP-complete. We then show that the problem of finding a most-stable matching in an instance of d-SRTI is solvable in polynomial time if d = 2, whilst for d = 3 we show that this problem is NP-hard and not approximable within n 1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P = NP. Due to various complications, as explained in Section 4, we do not attempt to define and study egalitarian stable matchings in instances of SRTI. Some open problems are presented in Section 5. A structured overview of previous results and our results (marked by * ) for d-SRI and d-SRTI is contained in Table 1 .
Related Work Degree-bounded graphs, most-stable matchings and egalitarian stable matchings are widely studied concepts in the literature on matching under preferences [21] . As already mentioned, the problem of finding a most-stable matching has been studied previously in the context of SRI [1] . In addition to the results surveyed already, the authors of [1] gave an O(m k+1 ) algorithm to find a matching M with |bp(M)| ≤ k or report that no such matching exists, where m = |E| and k ≥ 1 is any integer. Most-stable matchings have also been considered in the context of d-SRI [4] . The authors showed that, if d = 3, there is some constant c > 1 such that the problem of finding a most-stable matching is not approximable within c unless P = NP. On the other hand, they proved that the problem is solvable in polynomial time for d ≤ 2. The authors also gave a (2d − 3)-approximation algorithm for the problem for fixed d ≥ 3. This bound was improved to 2d − 4 if the given instance satisfies an additional condition (namely the absence of a structure called an elitist odd party). Most-stable matchings have also been studied in the bipartite restriction of SRI called the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI) [5, 14] . Since every instance of SMI admits a stable matching M (and hence bp(M) = ∅), the focus in [5, 14] was on finding maximum cardinality matchings with the minimum number of blocking edges.
Regarding the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in an instance of SRI, as already mentioned Feder [7, 8] showed that this problem is NP-hard, though approximable within a factor of 2. A 2-approximation algorithm for this problem was also given independently by Gusfield and Pitt [13] , and by Teo and Sethuraman [26] . [12, 15] in P for d = 2 ( * )
NP-hard even for d = 3 ( * ) not well-defined (see Section 4) These approximation algorithms can also be extended to the more general setting where we are given a weight function on the edges, and we seek a stable matching of minimum weight. Feder's 2-approximation algorithm requires monotone, nonnegative and integral edge weights, whereas with the help of LP techniques [25, 26] , the integrality constraint can be dropped, while the monotonicity constraint can be partially relaxed. Chen et al. [6] study the fixed-parameter tractability of computing egalitarian stable matchings in the setting of SRTI.
The Egalitarian Stable Roommates Problem
In this section we consider the complexity and approximability of the problem of computing an egalitarian stable matching in instances of d-SRI. We begin by defining the following problems. [10, 20] . 
Problem 1 EGAL d-SRI
. The use of this notation is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
We now construct an instance I of 3-SRI as follows. We define the following sets of vertices.
i ∈ V corresponds to vertex v i and its incident edge e i,r , whilst e s j ∈ E corresponds to edge e j and its incident vertex v j,s . The set V ∪ E ∪ W ∪ Z constitutes the set of agents in I, and the preference lists of the agents are as shown in Fig. 2 . In the preference list of an agent v r i (1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ r ≤ 3), the symbol Finally we define some further notation in I. Let K = 7m + 19n + K. The following edge sets play a particular role in our proof. Addition is taken modulo 4 here. 
Claim 2 If G has a vertex cover
j has its first-choice partner, so v r i does not block M with e(v r i ). It is straightforward to verify that M cannot admit any other type of blocking edge, and thus M is stable in I.
Clearly every agent in I is matched in M. We note that Theorem 4.5.2 of [12] implies that every stable matching in I matches every agent in I -we will use this fact in the next claim. We finally note that c(M) = 4k + 12k
Claim 3 If there is a stable matching M in
Proof Suppose that M is a stable matching in I such that c(M) ≤ K . We construct a set of vertices C in G as follows. As M matches every agent in I, then for each i
We now argue that C is a vertex cover. Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given and suppose
, a contradiction. Hence C is a vertex cover in G. Moreover if k = |C| then given the composition of M, as noted in the previous claim, c(M) = 7m + 19n + k, and since c(M) ≤ K it follows that k ≤ K.
Theorem 1 immediately implies the following result.

Corollary 4 EGAL 3-SRI is NP-hard.
We remark that EGAL 2-SRI is trivially solvable in polynomial time: the components of the graph are paths and cycles in this case, and the cost of a stable matching selected in one component is not affected by the matching edges chosen in another component. Therefore we can deal with each path and cycle separately, minimising the cost of a stable matching in each. Paths and odd cycles admit exactly one stable matching (recall that (i) the instance is assumed to be solvable, and (ii) the set of matched agents is the same in all stable matchings [12, Theorem 4.5.2]), whilst even cycles admit at most two stable matchings (to find them, test each of the two perfect matchings for stability) -we can just pick the stable matching with lower cost in such a case. The following result is therefore immediate.
Proposition 5 EGAL 2-SRI admits a linear-time algorithm.
Corollary 4 naturally leads to the question of the approximabilty of EGAL d-SRI. As mentioned in the Introduction, Feder [7, 8] provided a 2-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in an instance of SRI. As Theorems 6, 8 and 10 show, this bound can be improved for instances with boundedlength preference lists.
Theorem 6 EGAL 3-SRI is approximable within 9/7.
Proof Let I be an instance of 3-SRI and let M egal denote an egalitarian stable matching in I. First we show that any stable matching in I is a 4/3-approximation to M egal . We then focus on the worst-case scenario when this ratio 4/3 is in fact realised. Then we design a weight function on the edges of the graph and apply Teo and Sethuraman's 2-approximation algorithm [25, 26] to find an approximate solution M to a minimum weight stable matching M opt for this weight function. This weight function helps M to avoid the worst case for the 4/3-approximation for a significant amount of the matching edges. We will ultimately show that M is in fact a 9/7-approximation to M egal .
Claim 7
In an instance of EGAL 3-SRI, any stable matching approximates c(M egal ) within a factor of 4/3.
Proof Let M be an arbitrary stable matching in I. Call an edge uv an (i, j )-pair (i ≤ j) if v is u's ith choice and u is v's j th choice. By Theorem 4.5.2 of [12] , the set of agents matched in M egal is identical to the set of agents matched in M. We will now study the worst approximation ratios in all cases of (i, j )-pairs, given that 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 3 in 3-SRI.
• If uv ∈ M egal is a (1, 1)-pair then u and v contribute 2 to c(M egal ) and also 2 to c(M) since they must be also be matched in M (and in every stable matching).
• If uv ∈ M egal is a (1, 2)-pair then u and v contribute 3 to c(M egal ) and at most 4 to c(M). Since, if uv / ∈ M, then v must be matched to his 1st choice and u to his 2nd or 3rd, because one of u and v must be better off and the other must be worse off in M than in M egal .
• If uv ∈ M egal is a (1, 3) -pair then u and v contribute 4 to c(M egal ) and at most 5 to c(M). Since, if uv / ∈ M, then v must be matched to his 1st or 2nd choice and u to his 2nd or 3rd.
• If uv ∈ M egal is a (2, 2)-pair then u and v contribute 4 to c(M egal ) and at most 4 to c(M). Since, if uv / ∈ M, then one must be matched to his 1st choice and the other to his 3rd.
• If uv ∈ M egal is a (2, 3)-pair then u and v contribute 5 to c(M egal ) and at most 5 to c(M). Since, if uv / ∈ M, then v must be matched to his 1st or 2nd choice and u to his 3rd.
• If uv ∈ M egal is a (3,3)-pair then u and v contribute 6 to c(M egal ) and also 6 to c(M) since they must be also be matched in M (and in every stable matchingthis follows by [12, Lemma 4.3.9] ).
It follows that, for every pair uv ∈ M egal ,
Hence c(M)/c(M egal ) ≤ 4/3 and Claim 7 is proved.
As shown in Claim 7, the only case when the approximation ratio 4/3 is reached is where M egal consists of (1,2)-pairs exclusively, while the stable matching output by the approximation algorithm contains (1,3)-pairs only. We will now present an algorithm that either delivers a stable solution M containing at least a significant amount of the (1,2)-pairs in M egal or a certificate that M egal contains only a few (1,2)-pairs and thus any stable solution is a good approximation.
To simplify our proof, we execute some basic pre-processing of the input graph. If there are any (1,1)-pairs in G, then these can be fixed, because they occur in every stable matching and thus can only lower the approximation ratio. Similarly, if an arbitrary stable matching contains a (3,3)-pair, then this edge appears in all stable matchings and thus we can fix it. Those (3,3)-pairs that do not belong to the set of stable edges can be deleted from the graph. From this point on, we assume that no edge is ranked first or last by both of its end vertices in G and prove the approximation ratio for such graphs.
Take the following weight function on all uv ∈ E:
We designed w(uv) to fit the necessary U-shaped condition of Teo and Sethuraman's 2-approximation algorithm [25, 26] . This condition on the weight function is as follows. We are given a function f p on the neighbouring edges of a vertex p. Function f p is U-shaped if it is non-negative and there is a neighbour q of p so that f p is monotone decreasing on neighbours in order of p's preference until q, and f p is monotone increasing on neighbours in order of p's preference after q. The approximation guarantee of Teo and Sethuraman's algorithm holds for an edge weight function w(uv) if for every edge uv ∈ E, w(uv) can be written as w(uv) = f u (uv) + f v (uv), where f u and f v are U-shaped functions.
Our w(uv) function is clearly U-shaped, because at each vertex the sequence of edges in order of preference is either monotone increasing or it is (1, 0, 1). Since w itself is U-shaped, it is easy to decompose it into a sum of U-shaped f v functions, for example by setting
for every edge uv. Let M denote an arbitrary stable matching, let M (1, 2) be the set of (1,2)-pairs in M, and let M opt be a minimum weight stable matching with respect to the weight function w(uv). Since M opt is by definition the stable matching with the largest number of (1,2)-pairs, |M (1, 2) opt | ≥ |M (1, 2) egal |. We also know that w(M) = |M| − |M (1, 2) | for every stable matching M.
Due to Teo and Sethuraman's approximation algorithm [25, 26] , it is possible to find a stable matching M whose weight approximates w(M opt ) within a factor of 2. Formally,
This gives us a lower bound on |M (1,2) |.
We distinguish two cases from here on, depending on the sign of the term on the right. In both cases, we establish a lower bound on c(M egal ) and an upper bound on c(M ). These will give the desired upper bound of 9/7 on c(M ) c(M egal ) .
1) 2|M
(1,2) egal | − |M| ≤ 0 The derived lower bound for |M (1, 2) | is negative or zero in this case. Yet we know that at most half of the edges in M egal are (1,2)-pairs, and c(e) ≥ 4 for the rest of the edges in M egal . Let us denote |M| − 2|M (1, 2) egal | ≥ 0 by x. Thus, |M (1, 2) 
We use our arguments in the proof of Claim 7 to derive that an arbitrary stable matching approximates c(M egal ) on the
(1,2)-edges within a ratio of 4 3 , while its cost on the remaining |M|+x 2 edges is at most 5. These imply the following inequalities for an arbitrary stable matching M.
We now combine (2) and (3). The last inequality holds for all x ≥ 0. 2) 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M| > 0 Let us denote 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M| byx. Notice that |M (1, 2) egal | =x +|M| 2 . We can now express the number of edges with cost 3, and at least 4 in M egal .
Let |M (1,2) | = z 1 . Then exactly z 1 edges in M have cost 3. It follows from (1) that z 1 ≥x. Suppose that z 2 ≤ z 1 edges in M (1, 2) correspond to edges in M (1, 2) egal . Recall that |M − z 1 + z 2 edges in M egal that are as yet unaccounted for; these have cost at most 5 in both M egal and M . We thus obtain:
Combining (4) and (5) The last inequality holds for everyx > 0.
We derived that M , the 2-approximate solution with respect to the weight function w(uv) delivers a 9 7 -approximation in both cases.
Using analogous techniques we can establish similar approximation bounds for EGAL 4-SRI and EGAL 5-SRI, as follows.
Theorem 8 EGAL 4-SRI is approximable within 11/7.
Proof We start with a statement analogous to Claim 7.
Claim 9 In an instance of EGAL 4-SRI, any stable matching approximates c(M egal ) within a factor of 5/3.
Proof As earlier, we can fix all (1,1)-pairs and eliminate all (4,4)-pairs from the instance. Table 2 contains all cases for uv edges in M egal and the corresponding costs in an arbitrary stable matching.
We define the same weight function w(uv) as in the proof of Theorem 6. We remark here that w(uv) remains U-shaped for preference lists of length 4, because at each vertex the sequence of edges in order of preference is either monotone increasing or it is (1,0,1,1). Since we derived Inequality (1) without using the bounded degree property, it holds for EGAL 4-SRI as well. We distinguish two cases based on the sign of 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M|.
1) 2|M
(1,2) egal | − |M| ≤ 0 Let us denote |M|−2|M (1, 2) egal | ≥ 0 by x. Thus, |M (1, 2) egal | = |M|−x 2 . Furthermore, let y denote the number of edges with cost at least 5 in M egal .
3.5|M|+0.5x+y ≤ 11 7 2) 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M| > 0 Letx denote 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M| and y the number of edges with cost at least 5 in M egal . Due to Inequality (1), we know that at leastx (1, 2)-pairs in M egal correspond to edges of cost 3 in M . The remaining
(1, 2)-pairs in M egal correspond to edges of cost at most 5 in M .
5.5|M|−2.5x+y 3.5|M|−0.5x+y
Theorem 10 EGAL 5-SRI is approximable within 13/7.
Proof Again we start with a statement analogous to Claim 7.
Claim 11
In an instance of EGAL 5-SRI, any stable matching approximates c(M egal ) within a factor of 2.
Proof As earlier, we can fix all (1,1)-pairs and eliminate all (5,5)-pairs from the instance. Table 3 contains all cases for uv edges in M egal and the corresponding costs in an arbitrary stable matching. We remark that w(uv) remains U-shaped for preference lists of length 5, because at each vertex the sequence of edges in order of preference is either monotone increasing or it is (1,0,1,1,1) . We observe that Inequality (1) holds for EGAL 5-SRI as well. Thus we distinguish two cases based on the sign of 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M|.
1) 2|M
(1,2) egal | − |M| ≤ 0 Let us denote |M|−2|M
2 . Furthermore, let y be the number of edges with cost 5 and z the number of edges with cost at least 6 in M egal .
3.5|M|+0.5x+y+2z ≤ 13 7 2) 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M| > 0 Letx denote 2|M (1, 2) egal | − |M|, y the number of edges with cost 5 and z the number of edges with cost at least 6 in M egal .
6.5|M|−3.5x+y+2z 3.5|M|−0.5x+y+2z < 13 7 Using a similar reasoning for each d ≥ 6, our approach gives a c d -approximation algorithm for EGAL d-SRI where c d > 2. In these cases the 2-approximation algorithm of Feder [7, 8] should be used instead.
Solvability and Most-stable Matchings in d-SRTI
In this section we study the complexity and approximability of the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-SRTI admits a stable matching, and the problem of finding a most-stable matching given an instance of d-SRTI.
We begin by defining two problems that we will be studying in this section from the point of view of complexity and approximability. 
Problem 4 SOLVABLE d-SRTI
Input: I = G, O ,
(M)| = bp(I).
We will show that SOLVABLE 3-SRTI is NP-complete and MIN BP 3-SRTI is hard to approximate. In both cases we will use a reduction from the following satisfiability problem: (2,2)-E3-SAT is NP-complete, as shown by Berman et al. [2] . We begin with the hardness of SOLVABLE 3-SRTI.
Theorem 12 SOLVABLE 3-SRTI is NP-complete.
Proof Clearly SOLVABLE 3-SRTI belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from (2,2)-E3-SAT as defined in Problem 6. Let B be a given instance of (2,2)-E3-SAT, where X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } is the set of variables and C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m } is the set of clauses. We form an instance I = (G, O) of 3-SRTI as follows. Graph G consists of a variable gadget for each x i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), a clause gadget for each c j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and a set of interconnecting edges between them; these different parts of the construction, together with the preference orderings that constitute O, are shown in Fig. 3 and will be described in more detail below.
When constructing G, we will keep track of the order of the three literals in each clause of B and the order of the two unnegated and two negated occurrences of each A variable gadget for a variable
i with cyclic preferences. Each of these four vertices is incident to an interconnecting edge. These edges end at specific vertices of clause gadgets. The clause gadget for a clause c j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) contains 20 vertices, three of which correspond to the literals in c j ; these vertices are also incident to an interconnecting edge.
Due to the properties of (2,2)-E3-SAT, x i occurs twice in unnegated form, say in clauses c j and c k of B. Its first appearance, as the rth literal of c j (1 ≤ r ≤ 3), is represented by the interconnecting edge between vertex v 1 i in the variable gadget corresponding to x i and vertex a r j in the clause gadget corresponding to c j . Similarly the second occurrence of x i , say as the sth literal of c k (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) is represented by the interconnecting edge between v 3 i and a s k . The same variable x i also appears twice in negated form. Appropriate a-vertices in the gadgets representing those clauses are connected to v 2 i and v 4 i . We remark that this construction involves a gadget similar to one presented by Biró et al. [4] in their proof of the NP-hardness of MIN BP 3-SRI. Now we prove that there is a truth assignment satisfying B if and only if there is a stable matching M in I.
Claim 13 For any truth assignment satisfying B, a stable matching M can be constructed in I.
Proof In Fig. 4 , we define two matchings, M T i and M F i , on the variable gadgets and three matchings, M 1 j , M 2 j and M 3 j , on the clause gadgets. Fig. 4 The matchings corresponding to variable x i if it is set to be true and false, respectively, and to the first, second or third literal being true in a fixed clause c j
If a variable
Similarly, since at least one literal in c j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) is true, let r (1 ≤ r ≤ 3) be the minimum integer such that the literal at position r of c j is true; add M r j to M. The intuition behind this choice is that if a literal is true, then the vertex representing it in the variable gadget is matched to its best choice. On the other hand, if some literals in a clause are true, then the vertex representing the appearance of one of them in that clause is matched to its last-choice vertex.
We claim that no edge blocks M. Checking the edges in the clause and variable gadgets is easy. The five special matchings were designed in such a way that no edge within the gadgets blocks them. More explanation is needed regarding the interconnecting edges. Our construction shows that the complexity result holds even if the preference lists are either strictly ordered or consist of a single tie of length two. Moreover, Theorem 12 also immediately implies the following result.
Corollary 15 MIN BP 3-SRTI is NP-hard.
The following result strengthens Corollary 15.
Theorem 16 MIN BP 3-SRTI is not approximable within n 1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P = NP, where n is the number of agents.
Proof The core idea of the proof is to gather several copies of the 3-SRTI instance created in the proof of Theorem 12, together with a small unsolvable 3-SRTI instance. By doing so, we create a MIN BP 3-SRTI instance I in which bp(I) is large if the Boolean formula B (originally given as an instance of (2,2)-E3-SAT) is not satisfiable, and bp(I) = 1 otherwise. Therefore, finding a good approximation for I will imply a polynomial-time algorithm to decide the satisfiability of B. Our proof is similar to that of an analogous inapproximabilty result for the problem of finding a most-stable matching in an instance of the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples [3] . The smallest unsolvable instance of 3-SRTI is a 3-cycle with cyclic strict preferences. Aside from this, we add k disjoint copies of 3-SRTI instance created in the proof of Theorem 12 (from the same Boolean formula B), for large enough k. In particular we let c = 2/ε and k = n c 0 , where n 0 is the number of variables in B. We use m 0 to denote the number of clauses in B. Let I be the instance of 3-SRTI that has been constructed. Due to the proof of Theorem 12 above, if B is satisfiable then bp(I) = 1, and if B is not satisfiable then bp(I) ≥ k + 1. Hence a k-approximation algorithm for MIN BP 3-SRTI could be used to solve (2,2)-E3-SAT in polynomial time.
In the remainder of the proof we show that n 1−ε ≤ k, where n is the number of agents in I, which will imply the statement of the theorem. With Inequalities (6)- (9) we give an upper bound for n. This is used in Inequalities (11)- (14) as we establish k as an upper bound for n 1−ε . Explanations for the steps are given as and when it is necessary after each set of inequalities.
In Equality (6) can be deduced by inspection of the 3-SRTI instance constructed in the proof of Theorem 12. In step (7) we substitute m 0 = 4n 0 3 , which follows from the structure of B. We can assume without loss of generality that kn 0 ≥ 3, which we use in Inequality (8) . Finally, in Equality (9) we substitute k = n c 0 . Since c = 2/ε , the following inequality also holds.
We can now establish the desired upper bound for n 1−ε .
Inequality (11) is obtained by raising n to the power of each side of Inequality (10). Inequality (12) follows from the bound for n established in Inequalities (6)- (9) . Now in Inequality (13) we can assume without loss of generality that n 0 ≥ 32 and use that c−1 c+1 < 1. In the last step, we use the definition of k.
To complete the study of cases of MIN BP d-SRTI, we establish a positive result for instances with degree at most 2.
Proof For an instance I of MIN BP 2-SRTI, clearly every component of the underlying graph G is a path or cycle. We claim that bp(I) equals the number of odd parties in G, where an odd party is a cycle C = v 1 , v 2 , ..., v k of odd length, such that v i strictly prefers v i+1 to v i−1 (addition and subtraction are taken modulo k).
Since an odd party never admits a stable matching, bp(I) is bounded below by the number of odd parties [24] . This bound is tight: by taking an arbitrary maximum matching in an odd party component, a most-stable matching is already reached. Now we show that a stable matching M can be constructed in all other components.
Each component that is not an odd cycle is therefore a bipartite subgraph (indeed either a path or an even cycle). Such a subgraph therefore gives rise to the restriction of SRTI 
called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI).
An instance of SMTI always admits a stable solution and it can be found in linear time [22] . Thus these components contribute no blocking edge.
Regarding odd-length cycles that are not odd parties, we will show that there is at least one vertex not strictly preferred by either of its adjacent vertices. Leaving this vertex uncovered and adding a perfect matching in the rest of the cycle results in a stable matching.
Assume that every vertex along a cycle C k (where k is an odd number) is strictly preferred by at least one of its neighbours. Since each of the k vertices is strictly preferred by at least one vertex, and a vertex v can prefer at most one other vertex strictly, every vertex along C k has a strictly ordered preference list. Now every vertex can point at its unique first-choice neighbour. To avoid an odd cycle, there must be a vertex pointed at by both of its neighbours. This implies that there is also a vertex v pointed at by no neighbour, and v is hence ranked second by both of its neighbours.
Egalitarian Stable Matchings in SRTI
In this section we outline the difficulties one encounters when attempting to define and study the concept of an egalitarian stable matching in instances of SRTI.
• When considering the approximability of EGAL d-SRI, we restricted attention to the case of solvable instances, in the knowledge that solvability can be determined in linear time [15] . However in the case of SRTI, we can no longer assume this, since SOLVABLE 3-SRTI is NP-complete as Theorem 12 shows.
• In instances of EGAL d-SRI, not all agents are necessarily matched in all stable matchings, but due to Theorem 4.5.2 of [12] , which states that the same agents are matched in all stable matchings, we can discard unmatched agents and consider only the remaining agents when reasoning about approximation algorithms. There is no analogue of Theorem 4.5.2 in the case of d-SRTI (indeed, stable matchings can be of different sizes in a given instance of SRTI [17] ). This means that any approximation algorithm for the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in an instance of SRTI would need to consider the cost of an unmatched agent in a given stable matching, and the choice of value for such a case is not universally agreed upon in the literature. Chen et al. [6] study the fixed-parameter tractability of EGAL SRTI under different choices of cost value for an unmatched agent, namely 0, some positive constant and the length of its preference list.
• Similarly in the case of SRTI, the choice of value for the rank of an agent a j in a given agent a i 's preference list is again not universally agreed upon -for example if a i has a tie of length 2 at the head of his preference list, followed strictly by a j , then rank(a i , a j ) could reasonably be defined to be either 2 or 3 depending on the definition adopted. In most competitions, everybody in the tie receives the rank that directly follows the number of agents ranked strictly higher than them, which would be 3 in the previous example. On the other hand, setting the rank to the number of ties (of any cardinality) in the list up to the current tie is the correct way of dealing with this issue in markets where agents rank their possible partners into well-separated tiers and the cardinalities of these do not matter as much as the tier they end up being matched to -this principle assigns 2 to rank(a i , a j ) in the example above. 
Open Questions
